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This paper has a simple goal: it aims to present 
the difference between static logic and dynamic grammar. 
At the same time I will stress another difference which 
traverses logic and grammar: the difference between 
language idling and language in use. There is a 
development from static logic to dynamic grammar in 
Wittgenstein’s philosophy from early to late, whereas the 
difference between language idling and language in use 
pervades the whole oeuvre. Therefore I shall distinguish 
between four different conditions pertaining to the attempt 
to render the relations that hold language together. We find 
in early Wittgenstein ‘idle static logic’ and ‘static logic in 
use,’ and in late Wittgenstein ‘idle dynamic grammar’ and 
‘dynamic grammar in use.’ This four-fold distinction serves 
to emphasize that the crucial shift to ‘use,’ which is usually 
claimed to be a feature of the Philosophical Investigations, 
already takes place in the Tractatus. A negligence of this 
‘double shift’ from logic to grammar and from idle language 
to language in use brought about a vast amount of 
misapprehensions of Wittgenstein’s philosophy, especially 
of the account of rule following.  
I will begin this paper with an introduction to the 
problem of rule following. Secondly I shall present Kripke’s 
reading, which goes wrong because it opens up a gap 
between rule and application. The subsequent 
presentation of Baker and Hacker’s criticism of Kripke will 
focus on their take on internal relations. Even though they 
rightly hold that there is no gap between rule and 
application, they neglect the differentiation between idle 
language and language in use. An elaboration of the 
account of internal relations in the Tractatus—and how 
they are connected to Wittgenstein’s shift to ‘use’ in the 
early work already—will show Baker and Hacker’s 
shortcoming. 
 
1. Introduction 
At my first arrival in the United States at JFK 
Airport I bought a sandwich wrapped in paper. I was 
astonished upon discovering an imprint on the paper 
warning: “Paper is not edible.” I thought it odd and 
senseless to have such a warning on a piece of paper that 
was clearly not edible. Only after having lived in the United 
States for some time did I realize that it indeed made 
sense, as there are sandwiches, ‘wraps,’ which come 
wrapped in what looks very much like paper and is edible. 
In addition to that the culture of lawsuits in the United 
States makes it imperative to have such warnings on the 
paper of sandwiches, in order to prevent being sued by 
people who mistake their sandwich for a wrap. Anyway, 
when I first read the warning I was puzzled and not sure 
how I ought to understand it. It was so obvious to me to not 
to eat a sandwich with its paper on that I thought there 
must be another message behind it. I came up with various 
interpretations in order to make sense of the words. What 
did not come to me naturally is what every U.S. citizen 
would have done—to just not eat the paper. At 
Investigations § 199 Wittgenstein writes:  
 
“To obey a rule, to make a report, to give an order, to 
play a game of chess, are customs (uses, 
interpretations).” (Wittgenstein 1958) 
 
The same apparently holds for signposts or 
warnings. In order to understand a warning and act 
according to it, it is crucial to be immersed in a community 
that has a certain practice or ‘life’ with it. Understanding or 
not understanding the warning does not consist in making 
the right interpretation but in abiding by the interpretation, 
custom or use of the community, which issued the warning 
in the first place. In this sense ‘to understand a warning’ or 
again ‘to obey a rule’ are not interpretations, but actual 
uses that are made in actual cases. This is what 
Wittgenstein says at § 201: 
“[…] What this shews is that there is a way of grasping 
a rule which is not an interpretation, but which is 
exhibited in what we call “obeying the rule” and “going 
against it” in actual cases. “  
 
The section of the Philosophical Investigations, 
which is often called the ‘Rule Following Considerations’ 
has been read in this important way for almost two 
decades. More recently the reading of the ‘New 
Wittgenstein’ (called after the same book published in 
2000, including authors like James Conant and Cora 
Diamond) stresses that there is no gap between rules and 
interpretations in the first place. In this book it is shown 
again and again how one ought to leave behind the view 
that there is a paradox in rule following. Let us now see 
how we got to the paradox in the first place. 
 
2. How Kripke got it wrong 
We follow Saul Kripke on his way to the paradox in 
his groundbreaking contribution to the problem of rule 
following Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language 
published in 1982. He presents us with a simple 
mathematical problem, the addition of 68 and 57. Although 
the rule of addition determines for indefinitely many cases 
how to proceed, Kripke holds that someone’s grasp of the 
rule is problematic, as she can only compute finitely. Even 
though she might be sure that ‘125’ is the right answer 
there is nothing she can bring up to prove that she was 
really following a certain rule called addition, and not 
another rule called ‘quaddition,’ as Kripke’s skeptic claims 
she did. ‘Quaddition’ would look like adding up to the 
number 68 from whence the result is always 5. Now 
Wittgenstein says in PI 201: 
“This was our paradox: no course of action could be 
determined by a rule, because every course of action 
can be made out to accord with the rule.”  
 
Kripke’s paradox takes off the ground when asked 
by a skeptic, one is incapable of stating any fact of 
whatever kind as a proof that one really did follow a certain 
rule. Kripke argues that whatever we do is, “one some 
interpretation, in accord with the rule.” (Kripke 1982, 98) 
The problem is that anything could potentially serve as a 
fact about our former behavior or mental life for meaning 
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‘plus rather than quus’, as Kripke has it. Our corpus of 
finite data may always be subsumed under indefinitely 
many distinct generalizations. This means that ‘quus’ is as 
good a generalization for our data as ‘plus’ and we can do 
nothing to prove that ‘plus’ would be the right 
interpretation. But Kripke fails to acknowledge that §198 
claims: “Interpretations by themselves do not determine 
meaning.” Wittgenstein holds that to make interpretations 
of rules is not to follow rules. In § 201 he says: 
“[…] there is an inclination to say: every action 
according to the rule is an interpretation. But we ought 
to restrict the term “interpretation” to the substitution of 
one expression of the rule to another.”  
 
To think that the relation between rules and the 
grasping, understanding or application of rules needs to be 
secured by the right interpretation of that relation, is a 
mere tendency or inclination according to the 
‘Wittgensteinian’ interlocutor. Certainly, paragraph 195 has 
a vexed interlocutor say:  
“[But I mean that] in a queer way, the use itself is in 
some sense present.”  
 
which would support Kripke’s reading of the 
paradox, that there is something—a rule, the meaning of 
the word and its use present in it—that intimates ‘how to 
go on.’ But we cannot give any interpretation of ‘it’ that 
could prove what we meant (whether plus or quus or any 
other generalization of our finite data). Wittgenstein’s 
response to this vexed interlocutor is the following: he has 
another interlocutor immediately answer: 
“Of course it is, ‘in some sense’! Really the only thing 
wrong with what you say is the expression “in a queer 
way”[Wittgenstein 1958, §195]  
 
There is nothing queer or paradoxical about what 
we do, the second interlocutor says and points out that if 
we think something is queer we just have not properly 
understood the ‘use of the word’ and in what sense it is 
present when grasping the meaning of a word. It will hence 
be crucial to elaborate on what is meant by ‘the use of the 
word.’  
 
3. Baker and Hacker’s internal relations 
Two years after Kripke’s contribution to the ‘rule-
following considerations’ Baker and Hacker published 
Skepticism, Rules and Language an approach to the 
problem of rule-following that takes a definite stance 
against Kripke’s skeptical paradox and solution. They are 
the first to abandon Kripke’s influential reading of a 
paradox in rule following. Their claim is that “the absurd 
paradox that rules cannot guide one shows [is] that how 
one understands a rule need not be an interpretation, but 
is manifest in acting, in what we call ‘following a rule.’” 
(Baker and Hacker 1984, 13f) In the third part of their book 
Baker and Hacker give an outline of the important role 
internal relations play therein. They criticize the rule-
skeptic’s misapprehension of what ‘internal relations’ are 
and claim that rule-skepticism ignores or distorts the 
internal relations that hold between rules and their 
application.  
“[…] the rule skeptic comes into conflict with a 
conceptual truth expressing an internal relation 
between rules and their applications.” [Baker and 
Hacker 1984, 101] 
 
Baker and Hacker’s point is—as elaborated in the 
chapter above—that there is no interpretation needed to 
bridge rule and application, because there is no gap in the 
first place. The relation between rule and interpretation is 
internal. The rule skeptic distorts this relation. But how are 
we to understand internal relations? 
There is a flaw in Hacker and Baker’s account of 
internal relations. They use the term ‘internal relation’ 
interchangeably with the term ‘logical or grammatical 
relation’ and thereby they cover the fact that ‘internal 
relation’ is a prominent term only in the Tractatus and does 
not reoccur but once in the Philosophical Investigations. By 
pointing to the genesis of Wittgenstein’s view of internal 
relations they try to justify taking them in one. Early on 
Wittgenstein had held that internal relations are such that it 
is inconceivable that entities should not stand in this 
relation. (Wittgenstein 1922, 4.123) They are therefore 
necessarily true or tautological. Later on he added that 
nothing external could mediate between them. Baker and 
Hacker do exemplify internal relations by desire and its 
fulfillment. There is no third—like the feeling of 
satisfaction—allowed entering in. It is, as they claim, ‘a 
truth of grammar’ or a ‘necessary truth’ that the fulfillment 
of the desire to drink a pint of beer is to drink a pint of 
beer—“it can be read off the expression of the desire.” 
(Baker and Hacker 1984, 108) The internal relation is 
exhibited in grammar. Desire and fulfillment make, as it 
were, contact in language.  
Just as rule and application are internally related, 
so too an interpretation as mediation would stand in the 
same vain and drop out. But the example of rule and 
application is not so easy—there is no direct contact in 
language as in the example of drinking beer as desire and 
fulfillment. Baker and Hacker claim that the contact is 
made by “the practice of using language, of explaining and 
justifying its use. […] To understand the rule is to know 
what counts, in this technique, as doing the same.” (Baker 
and Hacker 1984, 115) Understanding the rule is then to 
know how to proceed in applying it. Therefore the 
explanation of a meaning of a word is a rule or standard for 
its correct use.  
“The uses of a word are viewed as the application of 
these rules (instances of following it)” (Baker, Hacker 
1984, 122].  
 
This makes Baker and Hacker privilege the rules 
of grammar in Wittgenstein’s late philosophy to the rules of 
logic, or logical syntax of the early Tractatus. They think 
that the shift from logic to grammar is crucial for 
understanding Wittgenstein’s ‘new’ account of rule 
following.  
Instead I shall claim that it is the shift from idle 
language to language in use which is necessary to 
understand rule following in Wittgenstein. Baker and 
Hacker’s account treats internal relations in the Tractatus 
not as that which is exhibited in language, but as holding 
between a proposition and a fact that makes it true. They 
claim that Wittgenstein presupposes some metaphysical 
harmony in his early work, which results in an isomorphism 
between language and world. Only later on, they claim, did 
Wittgenstein come to see that this harmony is merely 
forged in grammar.  
“The harmony between language and reality is no 
more than a reflection, a shadow of a rule for the use 
of signs, a grammatical convention.” [Baker and 
Hacker 1984, 126] 
 
There is no gap between rules of logical syntax 
and their application, or between rules of grammar and 
their application. But it can be shown easily in a quote how 
Hacker and Backer do indeed treat rules of syntax different 
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from rules of grammar. In their book Wittgenstein. Rules, 
Grammar and Necessity published only a year after 
Skepticism, Rules and Language they make the following 
claim 
“Wittgenstein’s ‘rules of grammar’ serve only to 
distinguish sense from nonsense. Unlike the depth 
rules of logical syntax, they do not reflect ineffable 
metaphysical truths.” (Baker and Hacker 1985, 40) 
 
On my reading the rules of logical syntax and the 
rules of grammar stand in the same vain. They are both 
‘that which shows,’ that which is exhibited when we use 
language. ‘What is exhibited when we use language’ is not 
an ineffable metaphysical truth but the rules of logical 
syntax in early Wittgenstein and the rules of grammar later 
on.  
It is utterly crucial to gain a better understanding of 
‘internal relations’ in order to understand why we do not 
need the extra step of interpretation when we try to link 
rule and application. What distinguishes my line of thought 
from theirs is that they hold the account of the Tractatus to 
be completely different from the later view in the 
Philosophical Investigations. It is the distinction between 
idle language and language in use that they do not take 
into consideration.  
At this point the analysis of ‘internal relations’ as 
they appear in the Tractatus and as they pave the way 
from language idling to language in use should follow. 
Time-restrictions do not allow going into detail now. 
Therefore I will simply sum up with my example from the 
beginning.  
     1. Static Logic  2. Dynamic Grammar  
 
I. Language idling “Paper is not edible” “Paper is not edible” 
 
II. Language in use “Paper is not edible” “Paper is not edible” 
Let us have a look at the relations between 
propositions and their constituents in (I.1.) Idle Static 
Logic. “Paper is not edible” is a tautology here because it 
is always true that paper is not edible; paper has the 
property of being not edible. Therefore the proposition 
“Paper is not edible” is senseless—like the propositions of 
the Tractatus, which Wittgenstein claims at the end of it 
(6.54). That does not mean that “Paper is not edible” is 
always senseless. When the proposition is actually used it 
‘makes sense’ This is how (II.1.) ‘Static Logic in Use’ 
differs from idle static logic. “Paper is not edible”, has 
sense in the actual case—when it is used it is true. 
(I.2.) Idle Dynamic Grammar is different from Idle 
Static Logic as Wittgenstein abandoned the idea of atomic 
constituents. The relations, which were stable between 
those smallest parts, became dynamic. Instead of logical 
rules that reigned between propositions and their 
constituents, one is left with a grammar of language 
games. Certain examples of how the word has been used 
before and which indicate in what ways one can use it are 
all the ‘rules’ we are left with. At this point it should be clear 
that the rule and the application of the rule fall together. 
Therefore I.2 Idle dynamic grammar is a fictional construct. 
Nevertheless Wittgenstein saw this condition as the most 
dangerous one, because it makes us think we actually use 
language, although we deal with mere idle grammar. 
These grammatical propositions do not do any work; they 
rather make us fall back into the mistake of thinking that 
there are rules apart from their application. Therefore II.2 
Dynamic grammar in use leaves us with the proposition 
“Paper is not edible”, which makes sense only in the actual 
use. E.g. when written on a piece of paper, which is 
wrapped around a sandwich, it means that you are most 
likely in the United States and need not try to sue the 
company who produced the sandwich.  
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